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Policy Watch
Government Analysis of the Benefits and
Costs of Regulation
 Robert W. Hahn
This feature contains short articles on topics that are currently on the agendas of
policymakers, thus illustrating the role of economic analysis in illuminating current debates.
Suggestions for future columns and comments on past ones should be sent to C. Eugene
Steuerle, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, The Urban Institute, 2100 M Street NW,
Washington, D.C. 20037.
Introduction
Expenditures incurred because of federal environmental, health, and safety reg-
ulation have grown dramatically in recent decades, and now total several hundred
billion dollars annually. These costs appear likely to increase significantly in the next
decade, as well. Yet the economic impacts of regulation receive much less scrutiny
than direct, budgeted government spending. The potential gains of regulatory re-
form are substantial. Research suggests that more than half of the federal govern-
ment's regulations would fail a strict benefit-cost test using the government's own
numbers (Hahn, 1998). There is ample research suggesting that regulation could be
significantly improved, so that we could save more lives with fewer resources (Morrall,
1986; Viscusi, 1996). One study found that a reallocation of mandated expenditures
toward those regulations with the highest payoff to society could save as many as
60,000 more lives a year at no additional cost (Tengs and Graham, 1996).
Recently, Congress has begun to show a greater interest in assessing the eco-
nomic impact of regulation. In 1996, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska added an
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amendment to the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 that required
the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide Congress
with estimates of the total annual benefits and costs of all federal regulatory pro-
grams and estimates of the benefits and costs of individual regulations. This statute
was the first to mandate such an accounting. In September 1997, the OMB pro-
duced its first report on the benefits and costs of regulation in response to the
Stevens amendment, available on the web at (http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/
EOP/OMB/html/rcongress.htm), and it recently completed a second report in the
fall of 1998. At this point it is not clear whether Congress will require additional
reports. This essay reviews the increasing use of economic analysis in regulatory
decision-making, assesses the first OMB report, and considers how the use of eco-
nomic analysis can help to inform regulatory decision-making.
Economic Analysis and Regulatory Reform: An Overview
The last six presidents have introduced different regulatory oversight mecha-
nisms, with varying degrees of success. In 1971, President Nixon established a
“Quality of Life Review” of selected regulations, under which the OMB required
agencies issuing regulations affecting health, safety, and the environment to coor-
dinate their activities. President Ford formalized and broadened the review process
in Executive Order 11821, which required that agencies prepare economic impact
analyses for OMB review for rules whose annual impact typically exceeded $100
million. In 1978 President Carter issued Executive Order 12044, which required
detailed regulatory analyses of proposed rule-makings and review by the Executive
Office of the President. In addition, he established two interagency groups. The
Regulatory Analysis Review Group, comprised of representatives from the Executive
Office of the President and regulatory agencies, examined a limited number of
proposed regulations expected to have substantial regulatory impact. The Regula-
tory Council, consisting of the heads of federal regulatory agencies, was asked to
publish a Calendar of Federal Regulations, which summarized major regulations under
development and was designed to point out regulatory overlap and to describe the
benefits and costs of the proposed actions.
The Reagan administration both broadened the scope of the regulatory review
and required estimates of costs and benefits for major regulations. Just after enter-
ing office, President Reagan announced the formation of his interagency Task
Force on Regulatory Relief to be chaired by Vice President Bush, which focused on
reviewing existing regulations. Reagan also issued Executive Order 12291, requiring
agencies to conduct benefit-cost analyses for all proposed major rules. Although
the OMB could not veto agency rules, it did have the power to send the analysis
back to the agency for reconsideration. A second executive order by Reagan re-
quired annual publication of the Regulatory Program of the United States, which re-
viewed regulations proposed by agencies for conformance with administration pol-
icy and priorities. The Bush administration replaced the Task Force on Regulatory
Relief with the Council on Competitiveness, headed by Vice President Quayle. Pres-The economic analysis of regulatory decisions is also increasing worldwide
(Guasch and Hahn, forthcoming). However, an OECD (1997) study of 18 countries
(including the United States) that require some assessment of the impacts of their
regulations concluded that at least so far, those analyses generally only have a “mar-
ginal influence” on decision-making. Nonetheless, the trend toward formally con-
sidering economic benefits and costs in regulatory decision-making at all levels of
government is likely to continue.
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ident Clinton replaced the Reagan Executive Order 12291 with Executive Order
12886, which requires similar regulatory analyses. In addition, Clinton initiated a
National Performance Review aimed at helping to “reinvent government.”
Following the Clinton initiatives, the 104th Congress made passionate pleas
for designing smarter, more efficient regulation, but several comprehensive regu-
latory reform bills, which called for greater use of benefit-cost analysis and improved
risk assessment, failed to pass. However, while far-reaching reforms failed, some
legislation was passed that increased congressional oversight of regulation. Exam-
ples include the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, the Small Business Reg-
ulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, and the Stevens amendment. While the
thrusts of each piece of legislation and the Clinton executive order differ, they share
a requirement that agencies take further steps to assess the benefits and costs of
different kinds of regulations.
Many states are also moving toward a systematic analysis of significant regula-
tory actions. According to a 1996 survey by the National Association on Adminis-
trative Rules Review, administrative law review officials in 27 states noted that their
state statutes require economic impact analysis for all proposed rules, and 10 states
require benefit-cost analysis for all proposed rules. However, the level of compliance
with those requirements, the quality of the analysis conducted, and their influence
on decision-making are not clear.
In its report to Congress on the benefits and costs of regulation, the OMB
(1997) defines federal regulation as statements issued by federal regulatory agencies
such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Communications
Commission to implement, interpret, or prescribe laws. The report distinguishes
between social regulation, such as environmental, health, and safety regulation, and
economic regulation, which addresses control of entry and/or prices and some
labor market regulation. It also includes a category for process regulation, often
referred to as paperwork or disclosure regulation, which includes the administrative
burdens of filing forms and reporting information to comply with regulations.
To derive an estimate of the total benefits and costs of regulation, the OMB
(1997) report begins with an estimate by Hahn and Hird (1991). That study re-
viewed and normalized available estimates of the gains from deregulating specific
sectors of the economy as well as estimates of the net benefits of federal regulatory
programs aimed at protecting health, safety and the environment. The report also
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used an estimate of the cost of environmental regulation (U.S. EPA, 1990). To
update those numbers to 1997, the report considers more recent work that iden-
tifies the benefits and costs of individual social regulations between 1990 and 1995
(OMB, 1996b; Hahn, 1996). It updates the estimate of the costs of economic reg-
ulation by adding some costs of transportation and banking from Hopkins’s (1992)
update of Hahn and Hird and then reduces those costs to account for some recent
banking and telecommunications deregulation.
For 1997, the OMB estimates that the benefits of environmental regulation
were $162 billion and the benefits for “other social regulation” were $136 billion
(in 1996 dollars). The costs for those two categories were $144 billion and $54
billion, respectively. So for social regulation, the aggregate annual benefits were
about $300 billion, and the aggregate annual costs were about $200 billion–with
environmental regulation accounting for a major share of both benefits and costs.
The OMB also finds costs of $71 billion for economic regulation and $10 billion
for paperwork. The agency makes no attempt to estimate the benefits of economic
regulation or paperwork, although it suggests that those benefits could be signifi-
cant, and gives examples like information disclosure requirements in the financial
sector.
In addition to examining the total benefits and costs of regulations, the report
provides some benefit and cost information on 41 regulations with annual gross
costs of $100 million or more. The OMB focused its discussion on 21 of those
regulations that have a direct impact on the private sector; the other 20 of the
regulations were rules necessary to implement federal budgetary programs. This
section of the report summarizes some information that is not easy to obtain. For
example, seven of the 21 rules summarized by the OMB in the report have positive
monetized net benefits. In six other cases, regulatory assessments noted benefits
that were quantified, but not monetized.
The final section of the main report provides recommendations. It argues
that the existing data on benefits and costs of programs would not support a
recommendation to eliminate or reform any particular program. It highlights
the problems with aggregate estimates and notes the need for more and better
analysis of individual regulations. It also notes some problems with the general
quality of analysis performed by the regulatory agencies. The report then sug-
gests how the regulatory oversight arm of the OMB can play an important role
in improving the quality of analysis and in developing a database on the benefits
and costs of major rules. For the most part, those recommendations build on a
consensus emerging within the economics community on how to improve the
quality of regulatory analysis (Arrow et al., 1996; Crandall et al., 1997). Key
recommendations include following “best practice” guidelines, estimating the
economic impact of regulations after they are in place, using consistent assump-
tions to compare the effectiveness of regulations, and developing a better
database. These next few sections consider potential improvements in several
areas: issues related to the cost and benefit estimates in the report, and some
recommendations for improving the quality of economic analysis in the regu-
latory process.Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulation    205
Estimating Benefits and Costs
The OMB (1997) report does recognize many of the methodological issues
involved with the aggregate estimates of benefits and costs. As they note, the “sub-
stance is in the details, not in the total.” However, future reports could be signifi-
cantly improved by more carefully evaluating the methodology for estimating total
benefits and costs.
One potentially serious problem with the report’s aggregate estimates is that
they combine a baseline estimate of actual compliance costs of regulation with
estimates of the expected costs of future regulations, with an assumption of full
implementation and compliance. For example, the baseline for environmental costs
is an EPA (1990) estimate for 1988 that relies primarily on historical survey infor-
mation on government and private expenditures. The OMB then adds assessments
of potential costs from government regulatory analyses of major regulation between
1987 to 1996. For other costs of social regulation, the baseline estimate is a Hahn
and Hird (1991) estimate for 1988 that relies on retrospective studies on the eco-
nomic impact of regulations in general areas such as highway safety and drug ap-
proval. However, the baseline cost estimates are not directly comparable with the
estimated incremental costs in the government regulatory analyses, and it is not
clear how best to combine them. The OMB report did not address that issue.
The estimate of the cost of economic regulation also has some problems. For
example, the OMB calculates the additional costs from banking regulations in the
early 1990s based on a study that the General Accounting Office (1993) criticizes
for having a poor survey design and low response rates. Moreover, it is focused
more on paperwork compliance costs than on efficiency costs. Then, the OMB’s
downward adjustment for recent deregulation of banking seems to be a back-of-
the-envelope calculation with little empirical support.
A second broad problem area is that the report fails to assess how critical
assumptions affect the net benefit estimates. For example, the OMB did not include
a rule related to stratospheric ozone (apparently because it was not in the Hahn
(1996) database); if it had, the benefit-cost ratio would have been orders of mag-
nitude higher. As another example, the OMB relied on a measure that included a
number of questionable cost savings, such as savings from productivity gains and
the avoided costs of cleanup. Excluding those savings would mean that total costs
just exceed total benefits. Without quarreling about the validity of such estimates,
future OMB reports should certainly highlight such key sensitivities. They should
also examine how key economic parameters affect results, such as the value of life,
the discount rate and the level of compliance with the rule.
A third problem is that the OMB does not provide a quantitative assessment of
the uncertainties in its estimates, though it notes they could be substantial. How much
confidence should be placed in the OMB's estimates that the annual benefits of social
regulation exceed annual costs by about $100 billion? On the benefit side, not all
the benefits of regulation can be quantified or monetized. On the cost side, regula-
tion may have potentially adverse impacts on investment, productivity and market
structure, which are not captured in the estimates (Hazilla and Kopp, 1990; Jaffe et206  Journal of Economic Perspectives
al., 1995). For example, firms frequently make strategic use of the regulatory process
to increase barriers to entry in an industry, which can reduce competition and con-
sumer welfare. Regulators can affect a firm's behavior in subtle ways simply by having
the ability to pass regulations and enforce laws selectively in ways that could hurt the
firm. There is growing evidence that economic deregulation has had substantial pos-
itive impact on productivity over time (Winston, 1998), which implies that the lack
of such productivity growth should be counted as a cost of economic regulation.
These questions are very difficult and few systematic studies have attempted to answer
them. It is probably wise that the OMB chose not to explore those issues in detail in
its first report. Nonetheless, such issues deserve to be acknowledged.
Recommendations for Improving the Quality of Analysis
The OMB can do a number of things to help improve our understanding of
the economic impact of regulation. A relatively simple way to clarify many of these
issues in future reports would be to provide tables that would show a step-by-step
derivation of each benefit-cost estimate. In developing such a table for my own use,
I found that the OMB made an arithmetical error on the benefit-cost ratio for social
regulation-in this case, leading to a $30 billion understatement of benefits.
  The OMB report has been criticized for ignoring several key economic aspects
of regulation (Hopkins, 1997, Dudley and Antonelli, 1997). First, the report does
not estimate how regulation affects transfers of wealth among different groups, such
as producers and consumers. Of course, transfers should not be listed as a “cost”
of regulation. But in many cases, the size of the transfer is potentially quite large
relative to the static cost of regulation; indeed, the transfer may be the purpose
behind the regulation. Estimating the size of transfers can help the public and
policymakers to identify the likely winners and losers from different regulations. It
can also point out regulations that may be desirable on distributional grounds even
if they do not pass a strict benefit-cost test. Finally, such information can be useful
in deciding whether regulation is the most efficient way to pursue a desired transfer.
A second, more contentious issue relates to including certain paperwork
costs-most notably those from completing tax forms. Because the average person
views filling out tax forms as a type of government regulation, that burden should
be included in the report in some form. However, there is an argument for keeping
this category separate. Estimating the benefits and costs of the tax code, including
both paperwork and efficiency costs, in a way that makes all transfers clear, is a
Herculean task. Changes in the amount of paperwork associated with filling out
tax forms may often alter the benefits, efficiency, and transfers in the tax code as
well. Rather than attempting to resolve these issues, it may be best simply to report
the raw estimate of paperwork costs in a separate category.
A third issue concerns the extent to which agencies collect information on the
full array of regulatory tools they use. Recent research suggests that agencies over-
seen by the OMB have a great deal of information on major rule-makings, but very
little information on minor rule-makings (Hahn, 1998). Knowledge on agencies notRobert W Hahn   207
overseen by the OMB is generally even less complete. Moreover, knowledge of the
economic impacts of alternative forms of regulation, such as licensing, permitting,
guidelines, enforcement, administrative orders, and letters of opinion is minimal (U.S.
House of Representatives, 1997). Both the agencies and academics can contribute to
greater understanding here–first by documenting the impacts of minor rule-
makings and then examining the relationship between different kinds of rule-
making. For example, as agencies are constrained in their efforts to pass major
rules, they can be expected to use other regulatory instruments. The extent and
impact of such behavior has not been documented.
Finally, the OMB should play a critical analytical role in regulatory analysis and
should not simply pass along the estimates developed by other agencies. The OMB
report takes the analysis contained in each agency’s regulatory assessment as gospel,
offering no additional analysis or insight based on its own detailed knowledge of
individual regulations. The agency should focus its efforts on developing good in-
cremental estimates of the impacts of individual regulations, an area in which it has
a clear comparative advantage.
The OMB argues that there is insufficient evidence to recommend eliminating
any specific regulatory programs. Surely, the demands of politics must play a role
in this refusal to judge, or even to question. At a minimum, the OMB should ask
those agencies who claim large net benefits for a program without a strong analyt-
ical basis to substantiate their view; if this means that the agencies need to fund
research to evaluate their programs, so be it. Even if the OMB is not comfortable
advocating the elimination or reform of programs, it might at least organize the
evidence in such a way as to facilitate comparisons. For example, the OMB could
develop a scorecard for individual regulations, regulatory programs, and statutes
to facilitate determining which regulations, programs, and laws are likely to pass a
benefit-cost test. When the maximum net benefits associated with a proposed rule
are small or negative, then the agency should have to offer some additional justi-
fication for its regulation.
A slightly more aggressive OMB could easily specify laws and regulations for elim-
ination or substantial reform. Table 1 provides suggestions for a number of laws and
regulations that should be targets for elimination. The programs include both eco-
nomic and social regulation. As can be seen from the table, annual welfare losses are
in the billions of dollars for some programs. There is also ample room for significantly
reforming regulatory programs. For example, expenditures on the Superfund program
to clean hazardous waste sites could be dramatically reduced while enhancing eco-
nomic efficiency and reducing overall risk (Viscusi and Hamilton, forthcoming) .
Even if my suggestions for improving policy analysis are implemented, a very
real question exists as to how such analysis would affect policy outputs. There are
certainly cases in which analysis is ignored or manipulated to achieve political ends.
However, there is a stronger argument that carrying out economic analysis, and
exposing such analysis to sunshine and reassessment, should encourage politicians
to pursue more efficient policies (Morgenstern, 1997).
It may be that the Office of Management and Budget, as an arm of the exec-
utive branch, will find it institutionally difficult to pursue an aggressive advocacy ofMilk Marketing Orders $343-$608 million annual
     welfare loss (1985$)
Davis-Bacon Act $200 million annual
     welfare loss (1988$)
Corporate Average Fuel
      Economy Standards
Land Disposal Regulation
$4 billion welfare loss from
     1978 through 1989
     (1990$)
$143 million annual
      expected cost. Benefits
     are not monetized
     (1992$)
Not available
Off-Label Drug Use Manufacturers cannot legally advertise
      a pharmaceutical product for any
      use that the FDA has not specifically
      approved.
1933 Act prohibits commercial banks
      from underwriting corporate
      securities.
Glass-Steagall Act Not available
 Sources: Beales (1996), Dardis and Bedore (1990), Hahn and Hird (1991), Hufbauer and Elliott (1994),
 Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Leone and Parkinson as cited by Crandall (1992), U.S. EPA (1995), and
 U.S. ITC (1995)-
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Table 1
Regulations and Programs That Could Be Targeted For Elimination
Regulation/Act Description Welfare Loss
Various tariffs and quotas constrain
      international trade.
 Ships travelling between U.S. ports
      must be built in U.S. shipyards,
      owned by U.S.- citizens, and
      operated by an American crew
USDA price discrimination scheme
      raises the price of fluid milk and
      drives down the price of
      manufactured milk products.
Federally funded construction projects
      are required to pay laborers
     “prevailing wages.”'
Each auto manufacturer must meet
      federal average fuel economy
      standards.
1995 Rule prohibits the disposal of
      various untreated hazardous wastes-
$3.5 billion annual welfare
    loss. ( 1990$)
$2.8 billion annual welfare
    loss (1991$)
International Trade
      Restrictions
Jones Act
regulatory reform, since this stance will inevitably involve conflict with other agen-
cies in the executive branch. One way to strengthen the OMB's hand would be to
have the Council of Economic Advisers play a co-equal role in the development of
the report. Currently, the CEA helps on the report, but the OMB is primarily re-
sponsible for the drafting. Elevating the CEA's role could help reduce the scope
for political meddling.
Another alternative is to provide some competition to the OMB in the form of
a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis. Just as both the Congressional
Budget Office and the OMB develop budget estimates, and each is disciplined by
the existence of the other, it may be useful to have a parallel Congressional office
on the regulatory side. Such an office could provide an alternate source of infor-
mation and stimulate improved analysis and review of agency rules within the ex-
ecutive branch. High-quality annual or biannual reports on regulation by these
agencies could help elevate the level of public discussion.Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulation   209
Conclusion
Politicians frequently hear from voters and business about the evils of regula-
tion, but they also see social regulation as an increasingly attractive mechanism for
redistributing wealth, given fiscal constraints. Thus, it is not surprising that the
reaction to the OMB report was mixed. Those politicians wishing to curb the ex-
cesses of social regulation were generally disappointed with the OMB report for not
going far enough. Those politicians who see benefit-cost analysis as a threat to social
programs, rather than a way of improving them, took solace in the fact that the
OMB report found that total regulatory benefits exceed cost.
The primary contribution of the OMB (1997) report is to lend legitimacy to the
idea that policymakers should, where possible, quantify and compare benefits and costs
before making major regulatory decisions. However, the report falls short as a critical
document; it fails to ask difficult questions–or any questions at all–of the agencies
carrying out regulations, and fails to confront a body of research that suggests that a
substantial share of government regulations would not pass a benefit-cost test.
The OMB's (1997) report also has the value of highlighting the limitations of
our knowledge in many areas. For example, we still know very little about the ben-
efits and costs of antitrust, banking and security regulation, and regulation aimed
at protecting consumers from fraud. We know very little about the dynamic impacts
of regulation on innovation, investment, and productivity. We know little about
designing political institutions that promote more efficient regulation. Finally, ac-
ademics can be helpful in providing new insights on whether benefit and cost es-
timates for proposed regulations tend to be overstated or understated, remember-
ing that proponents may be overly optimistic and that affected industries may cry
wolf. These gaps in our understanding offer great opportunities for researchers
who wish to produce knowledge useful for policymakers.
The helpful comments of Robert Crandall, Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Jay Hamilton, Randy
Kroszner, Robert Litan, Andrew Mahony, John Morrall, Richard Schmalensee, Robert
Stavins, Daniel Sumner, Leigh Tripoli, Larry White, Clifford Winston, and Fumie Yokota are
gratefully acknowledged. The views in this paper reflect those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which he is affiliated.
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